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 Abstract 
 
 The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the Civil War was indeed brought 
about because of the presence of slavery in this country. It is this paper’s thesis that not only 
did slavery provide a demonstrable economic incentive for the South to secede from the Union 
but also provided a social impetus as well. Slavery created a society in the South that favored 
the economic independence of states rather than economic integration not just because of a 
love for state’s rights but also because any form of economic integration would diminish 
returns from the sizeable investment they, slave-owners, had made in slavery. Furthermore, 
slavery created a type of siege mentality in the South. This mentality, while helpful in muting 
the class tensions between the slave holding elites and poor whites, created a narrow identity 
amongst southerners that would have made secession that much easier. This paper will look at 
how the concepts of social distance and social capital helped make secession a likely outcome 
for the southern states. With these two factors in play, the cost of leaving the Union, of re-
coordinating a new constitutional arrangement, was less costly than it might have been if not 
for slavery.  
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Introduction 
 
The U.S. Constitution is one of the most enduring documents in world history, 
helping provide stability for vastly different states and their respective citizens in both 
the political and economic sphere. Yet before the U.S had reached the centennial 
celebration of its break with England war broke out between the North and the South. 
The Constitution survived this tumultuous period, growing stronger in the following 
years. The fact that the Constitution survived, though, hides that the Constitution, as 
originally written, was not a durable document. The three-fifths clause, included to 
ensure Southern participation in the Union and also to assuage northern fears of 
southern domination, contributed to the creation of divergent economic interests in the 
North and South. The economic power of slavery made the concept of secession that 
much more alluring for the South, as secession would provide safety for the 
considerable investment of capital into the peculiar institution. The purpose of this 
paper, however, is to show that the social institution of slavery also helped create social 
distance between North and South. Furthermore, slavery helped create a social capital 
in the South that proved incapable of bridging the gap with any group not overtly 
friendly towards slavery. As a result, the cost of re-coordination became less meaningful 
over time until the Civil War broke out. 
 It is hoped that this paper can provide satisfactory evidence to this claim by 
looking at three areas. First, the role slavery held in the economy of the South and how 
this created the foundation for secession. This will require looking at how central the 
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slave economy was to the southern way of life and how it came to be so. This evidence, 
while certainly not new, will show how the Founders, despite their best intentions, 
crafted a constitution that was ultimately not durable as it helped create divergent, and 
ultimately opposed, economic systems. Second, how the South remained disconnected, 
as far as transportation was concerned, from the rest of the country shall be examined. 
This isolation contributed to the social distance between the North and South and also 
contributed to both regions developing strong, cohesive identities that were, again, in 
conflict with one another. Finally, a closer look at southern slavery and its impact on 
both race relations and relations between rich and poor whites in the South is needed. 
This will show that, while the social capital generated in the South was able to gloss over 
class differences, it also exacerbated the regional differences with the North.  
 
Understanding Constitutions 
First, it is important to explain how constitutions will be understood in this 
paper. For this reason, Russell Hardin’s argument that constitutions are coordination 
interactions rather than contractual exchanges is central to the purposes of this paper. 
As will be explained, understanding constitutions as contracts clouds the fact that 
constitutions are maintained mostly because the cost of leaving a constitutional 
arrangement is prohibitively high. As the focus of this paper is on how slavery helped 
enable the South’s secession in a number of ways, such a narrow examination of the 
topic of constitutionalism is appropriate. By only examining the matter as a type of cost-
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benefit analysis, as Hardin does, one can better appreciate the evidence being 
presented to support the paper’s thesis, something that might become convoluted by 
engaging in a comparison with Locke or Hobbes.  
For Hardin, there are two primary reasons constitutions are traditionally 
understood as contracts. First, such a description holds explanatory force in relating the 
creation of a constitution to the term “social contract”. In other words, it is easier to 
relate to a constitution and why it should be obeyed if it is portrayed as a contract. 
Second, Hardin writes that there is a “normative force of using contract theory in the 
analysis of social institutions to give a justification for them”.
1
 Put simply, such an 
understanding gives people a way to justify the existence of various institutions and the 
services they provide, by seeing them as part of a contract between the government 
and the people. 
But there are fundamental differences between constitutions and contracts 
which cannot be ignored. Contracts govern exchanges, transactions in which each side 
gains something that they value more than what they already have. Such transactions 
result in both parties coming off better than they were previously.
2
 Furthermore, 
contracts are enforced by an external party or parties who can impose penalties on 
those found to be in breach of contract. Governments are often the final arbiter in 
contractual disputes, giving contractual agreements more stability. This stability allows 
                                                          
1
 Hardin, Russell. Why a Constitution? The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism. Ed. Bernard 
Grofman, Donald Wittman. Agathon Press. 1989. New York. 100 
2
 Ibid, 106 
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for “longer term efforts to create values, to specialize”. With stability comes 
predictability, and predictability allows for complicated efforts to be undertaken that 
would otherwise be impossible without contracts, such as projects that require 
considerable capital. Also, penalties for a breach of contract are often spelled out in 
exacting fashion so as to better ensure predictability.
3
 After all, knowing your exact 
punishment is a better deterrent than a vague threat which might not be enforceable in 
the end. 
Constitutions are very different creatures by comparison. Unlike contracts, 
constitutions are not exchanges. Rather, they establish the framework of predictability 
which allows for specialized exchanges, namely contracts, to take place. Hardin 
describes constitutions as regulating “a long-term pattern of interactions”, thus making 
it easier to “cooperate and coordinate in particular moments”.
4
 Constitutions, by 
creating the framework for exchanges, allow for complex interactions by providing 
certainty for all the parties involved in a contract. In short, constitutions are what enable 
contracts to have the necessary stability to encourage cooperative efforts. 
 More importantly for the purposes of this paper, constitutions differ from 
contracts in terms of enforcement. When it comes to constitutions, those parties 
involved in the establishment and future maintenance of the constitutional 
arrangement have no external party to arbitrate disagreements. Any conflicts between 
parties must be resolved by those involved, something that no reasonable contract 
                                                          
3
 Hardin, 106,111 
4
 Ibid, 101 
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would allow; the potential for bias would be too great.
5
 Furthermore, unlike contracts 
which are precise in scope and penalties, constitutions are often gambles because those 
crafting the constitution often don’t know how things will turn out years later. Hardin 
highlights this difference by reminding us of the fears of the Anti-federalists, who 
worried that “the presidency would evolve into a virtual monarchy” over time.
6
 Add this 
uncertainty on top of the lack of an external arbiter and constitutions look less and less 
like contracts. 
After reviewing all the ways in which constitutions are not like contracts a more 
important question arises: how are constitutions maintained over time? With little in 
the way of assurance as to how institutions will develop and no external arbiter to settle 
disputes, longevity for a constitution seems doubtful. Hardin posits that, regarding 
constitutions, consent is less important for a constitution’s longevity than 
acquiescence.
7
 As long as people acquiesce to the coordination system setup by a 
constitution, stability will be maintained. Hardin draws a distinction between consent 
and acquiescence, as acquiescence merely requires that one not leave a body politic 
while consent implies willful agreement with a body politic. You certainly don’t need to 
agree with something to acquiesce, but you do need to have some agreement if you 
give consent. 
                                                          
5
 Hardin, 111 
6
 Ibid, 111 
7
 Ibid, 111 
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When looking at the U.S., it is important to remember that the U.S. Constitution 
was ratified by the States, whose governments were organized by the citizens of those 
states. Thus, consent, though technically delegated by the majority of people, was given 
to the Constitution. This consent, though, does not naturally pass on to later 
generations, a fact that Abraham Lincoln observed in his Lyceum Address, decades 
before the Civil War. 
 
And thus, from the force of circumstances [the American Revolution], the 
basest principles of our nature, were either made to lie dormant, or to become active 
agents in the advancement of the noblest of cause-that of establishing and maintaining 
civil and religious liberty. 
 But this state of felling must fade, is fading, has faded, with the circumstances 
that produced it. 
 I do not mean to say, that the scenes of the revolution are now or ever will be 
entirely forgotten; but that like every thing else, they must fade upon the memory of 
the world, and grow more and more dim by the lapse of time.
8
 
 
The people at the time of the Revolution certainly had more invested in the 
Constitution, but later generations simply would not have that same attachment. They 
had not helped give birth to the country in the same way, thus could not be as attached 
as previous generations. Thus, the idea of mere acquiesce has real merit in this light 
even for a country founded upon consent. 
Looking back to the Founding, though, even this ratification process relied a 
good deal more on mere acquiesce rather than consent. To prove his point, Hardin 
points to the fact that certain founders, namely Hamilton, preferred crafting a new 
constitution rather than trying to amend the Articles of Confederation. The amending 
                                                          
8
Lincoln, Abraham. Address to the young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838. Lincoln: 
Selected Speeches and Writings. Ed. Fehrenbacher, Don. First Vintage Books/The Library of America 
Edition. 1992. New York. 20 
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process was seen as impossible as any amendment required universal agreement. Such 
agreement was highly unlikely, as the various interests, fears, and needs of the different 
states made such agreement problematic. Hamilton wrote of how crafting a new 
constitution would prevent states such as Rhode Island from blocking an important 
amendment that they alone disagreed with.
 9
  
To further illustrate this point, Hardin points out that not all of the states ratified 
the Constitution at once, as Rhode Island held out for two years of the Constitution 
being in place before ratifying it. This example, while helpful, is not as striking as far as 
consent is concerned as those states in which a slim majority voted in favor of 
ratification. Key states such as New York and Virginia only voted in favor of ratification 
by the slimmest of margins.
10
 Those delegates who voted against ratification, who 
represented their constituencies, clearly favored not giving their consent to the 
Constitution, yet they remained within the constitutional framework. Their 
acquiescence was what mattered in the end, not their consent.  
Over time, though, people may decide that acquiescing is more costly than 
attempting to re-coordinate under a new system. For many, the cost of reneging on a 
constitutional system would be too high. Insufficient numbers of supporters, superior 
arms amongst those in power, inability to know how such willful disobedience will 
ultimately pan out, all of these things usually make re-coordination an undesirable 
option. But if a group of people, sufficiently organized, felt that such uncertainty would 
                                                          
9
 Hardin, 108 
10
 Ibid, 108-109 
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ultimately be in their best interest, re-coordination would be a plausible option.
11
 For 
Hardin, no one ever leaves the State of Nature completely; the cost of self-enforcement 
is merely increased substantially so as to encourage acquiescence. Furthermore, re-
coordination can be for any reason as far as Hardin is concerned, as long as the cause is 
deemed worth the risk.  
For the South, the cause worth risking the perils of re-coordination was slavery. 
The economic pull of slavery is often credited with providing the South with the 
necessary impetus to brave uncertainty, and rightly so. The economic power of slavery 
in the 19
th
 century is undeniable, and such economic power has historically been the 
cause of many civil wars throughout history. As mentioned previously, though, the 
purpose of this paper is to examine how slavery as an institution, not just as an 
economic factor but also as a social institution, also helped reduce the costs of re-
coordination. For that reason, a brief explanation of some of the terms and concepts 
that will appear later is in order. 
The first concept that will be explored is social distance and its importance in 
creating strong, cohesive identities. Social distance refers to how close people feel to 
one another, how likely they are to relate to other people. Where there is great social 
distance, there is a lack of understanding. Where there is little social distance, there is 
more understanding. For the purposes of this paper, the way social distance creates 
concepts of “us” and “them” through competition shall be explored. The focus on how 
                                                          
11
 Hardin, 113 
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such identities are formed will be the Transportation Revolution of the 19th century. 
This period ultimately created more social distance between the North and South. 
Mostly this distance came about because both free and slave territories were able to 
maintain a stronger sense of cohesion.  With a stronger sense of self, re-coordination 
becomes easier if that sense of self is different from those you are currently engaged 
with in a constitutional system. You have less to compromise on, as you will now have 
an overwhelming majority centered on what makes your people a distinct people. 
The other term that shall be discussed is social capital, a topic most recently 
brought to mass public attention by the works of Robert Putnam. Social capital in this 
sense is what essentially reduces the costs for people to work together to accomplish 
something. This is related to social distance, as where there is little social distance there 
is greater social capital, and vice versa. In the South, slavery and its maintenance was 
able to overcome the class divides amongst whites, enabling them to work together 
towards a common goal. The manner in which slavery was maintained, however, helped 
create a type of siege mentality amongst southern whites, where outsiders were 
typically viewed with suspicion and fear. Such was the case even amongst southerners, 
but they at least had a common goal in the protection of a common institution. With 
northerners, there was no such common goal. Thus, the very social capital that was built 
in the South, based on paternalism, intimidation and violence, was ultimately social 
capital that created social distance between Northerners and Southerners. As such, re-
coordination becomes even more likely. 
10 
 
These are brief descriptions of the concepts to be discussed, but they do set the 
stage for the discussion about to take place. Slavery, as both an economic power and a 
social institution, ultimately helped render the constitutional agreement held by the 
states null and void for a time. There was simply too much at stake from a southern 
perspective to not risk re-coordination. Acquiescence was no longer feasible. 
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Slavery: Its Growing Power 
 
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to 
give this one connected country to one united people-a people descended from the 
same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to 
the same principles of government, very similar in manners and customs.
12
 
 The Founders had many reasons to be hopeful that the new Constitution they 
had created would support an enduring government, of which the homogeneity of the 
population would be a significant factor. Despite the considerable homogeneity 
amongst the population, though, war did eventually break out between the states. 
Slavery was the cause of this violent disagreement between the North and South, 
providing ample economic and political justification for Southern interests to risk the 
uncertainty of leaving the Union. So why did the Founders not consider this potential 
outcome when they created the Constitution? Simply put, many of them believed 
slavery was not in America’s future. 
 During the American Revolution, many thought slavery was heading toward its 
end in the former colonies. Many prominent individuals, including slave-owning 
southerners such as Jefferson, were speaking out publically against the institution. 
Jefferson’s first draft of the Declaration of Independence, in fact, decried the institution 
and blamed England for its presence and continuation in the colonies. This section was 
excluded from the final draft, but the fact that it was even suggested in the first place by 
a slave-owner speaks to the sentiments of many of the Founders during the Revolution. 
                                                          
12
 Jay, John. The Natural Advantages of Union. The Federalist. Ed. Wright, Benjamin Fletcher. The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press. 1961. Cambridge. 94 
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The final draft of the Constitution itself also provides some evidence of this attitude, as 
slavery is never referred to directly in the document. Furthermore, the constitution 
called for ending the importation of “persons” by the year 1808, providing considerable 
evidence that the drafters of the Constitution believed the end of slavery was in sight.
13
 
 There was ample evidence to support the idea that slavery was dying in America 
other than public attitudes. In 1774 both Rhode Island and Connecticut banned the 
further importation of slaves through the slave trade into their borders. In fact, 
throughout the northern states slavery was being slowly extinguished, as states such as 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York had all either 
abolished slavery or passed laws for its gradual elimination.
14
 Such signs of slavery’s 
decline were not limited to the area’s north of the Mason-Dixon Line either, as they 
appeared in the South as well. In Virginia the Black Code, those laws put into place 
concerning slaves, began to fall into neglect and attitudes concerning blacks began to 
relax. For instance, many slave-owners began allowing their slaves to travel, 
unaccompanied, between plantations. Also, blacks, free and slave, frequently socialized 
with poor whites, eating and drinking in the same establishments. Free blacks could 
even own property and carry arms in the militia in some areas.
15
 
 The signs of slavery’s demise in the South were not just limited to a relaxing of 
attitudes; they also involved economic and political trends as well. Many Upper South 
                                                          
13
 Wood, Gordon. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815. Oxford University Press. 
2009. New York. 519 
14
 Ibid, 518-520 
15
 Ibid, 520-521 
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states created new manumission laws, making it much easier for owners to free their 
slaves. The state legislature of Virginia passed a new private manumission law in 1782 
that even allowed for slaves to buy their own freedom. Similar laws throughout the 
Upper South led to increasing numbers of free blacks; “By 1790 the free black 
population in the Upper South had increased to over thirty thousand, by 1810 the free 
blacks in Virginia and Maryland had numbered ninety-four thousand.”
16
 Economically 
speaking, such laws came to pass because slavery was seen as unsustainable. Many felt 
slavery would die out because North America seemed to rely exclusively on imported 
slaves, which was expensive. Further south, in states such as South Carolina, slaves 
experienced higher mortality rates. These high mortality rates meant importation was 
heavily relied upon and at considerable cost. The continued importation of slaves just 
wasn’t economically viable in the long run. The Constitution’s prohibition of slave 
importation after 1808 seemed to put an end to an economically unsustainable practice 
and slavery would end with the end of importation.
17
 
 Despite all of these indicators, though, there were many other signs that slavery 
would only continue to grow in the U.S. during the 19
th
. One of the most important 
factors that helped to ensure the survival of slavery was the birthrate of slaves. The 
slave population was breeding just as fast as whites in North America, which meant 
their numbers were “nearly doubling…every twenty to twenty-five years”. This meant 
regions such as the Chesapeake, which included Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, had 
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 Wood, 522 
17
 Ibid, 523 
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an overabundance of slaves, who had lower mortality rates than slaves further south. 
Furthermore, this excess number of slaves had little to do. Traditionally plantations in 
the Chesapeake region produced tobacco, which required considerable numbers of 
slaves to both grow and cure. Tobacco, though, depletes soil quickly. As a result, many 
planters began shifting towards wheat, a less labor intensive crop that doesn’t have the 
same impact on soil quality as tobacco. This led to slave-owners hiring out their slaves 
for work in order to pay for themselves. This only furthered the notion in many people’s 
minds that slave labor was slowly being replaced by wage labor.
18
  
 But there were other ways slave-owners could put their excess slaves to use. In 
states such as South Carolina rice was the primary staple crop. It was easy to plant and 
maintain, and profits could be increased simply by having more slaves to plant and 
harvest. South Carolina had a seemingly insatiable appetite for slaves, as the state 
reopened the foreign slave trade in 1803 to meet the demand. Between then and 1807, 
just before the federal requirement for the end of the foreign slave trade set in, over 
forty thousand slaves were brought into South Carolina. The reason for such demand 
was that the marshes that were ideal for growing rice were also ideal for diseases. Many 
slaves died because of rampant disease which is why the mortality rate of slaves was so 
much higher than further north.
 19
 
 The shift to cotton production amongst plantation owners in the Deep South 
further strengthened the demand for more slaves. Thanks to Eli Whitney’s cotton gin, it 
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 Wood, 510-11, 523 
19
 Ibid, 526 
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became economically viable to raise short-staple cotton. For years cotton production 
had been limited to the production of the less profitable long-staple variety, as short-
staple required considerable effort to produce as the seeds had to be removed by hand. 
This was a time consuming process that ultimately kept plantations from producing this 
crop. With the cotton gin, though, ones output was limited only to how much cotton 
one could have hauled in for processing, as the gin mechanically removed the seeds 
nearly effortless.  The new potential for economic gain led to cotton production moving 
into the Southwest as well. For years slavery had been somewhat limited to the coasts 
of the Deep South, where conditions were better suited for rice production. With the 
shift to cotton on plantations, slave-owners could move west with their slaves. By 1805 
“cotton production in the South had multiplied thirty-fold, from two million pounds to 
sixty million pounds a year”.
20
 
 All of this helped create demand and seemed to offer a profitable solution to the 
increasing number of slaves in the Chesapeake region. States such as Virginia and 
Maryland had been seeing their inhabitants leave for the territories of Kentucky and 
Tennessee, leading those states closer to population parity between whites and blacks. 
This caused some concern amongst the white population regarding potential racial 
conflict in the wake of the rebellion in Saint-Domingue, of which more will be said later. 
By selling their excess slaves to the Deep South and the emerging territories they could 
make a considerable profit. Without the same shipping costs of the Trans-Atlantic slave 
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trade they could afford to sell slaves for less and still make a good profit. After the 
foreign slave trade became illegal in 1808 the potential for profits from slave sales 
became even greater, as the internal slave trade enjoyed a monopoly. The slave-owners 
of the Chesapeake, seeing a potential market for their excess slaves, began selling slaves 
to the Deep South states, creating a domestic slave trade that was much cheaper than 
continually importing slaves. By the early 19
th
 century, around 20 percent of the slaves 
from the Chesapeake were sent to the new territories of Kentucky and Tennessee.
21
 Due 
to the success of the internal slave trade and cotton production, slavery was a lasting 
and thriving institution in 19
th
 century America, contrary to the predictions of many. 
 This was in sharp contrast, of course, to the trajectory of the northern economy. 
In large part because of the boom in cotton production in the 19
th
 century, textile 
factories began cropping up in the North in greater numbers, helping the cause of 
industrialization. The War of 1812, which caused discord within the maritime industry of 
the North, resulted in even more capital shifting to textile factories.
22
 The attitude 
towards work was also different in the North, where labor was seen as “fit for all social 
ranks”.
23
 Such attitudes, coupled with the climate and soil quality of the Northern 
states, meant that slavery marched on to its eventual death in the North. 
Looking at the South’s limited experience with factories highlights the unsuitable 
nature of slavery for industrial work. Initially, slave labor was common in Southern 
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 Wood, 526 
22
 Howe, Daniel Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848. Oxford 
University Press. 2007. New York. 132 
23
 Wood, 530-31 
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factories, but as the years went by such practices were proving unprofitable. The price 
of slaves was increasing every year after the end of the foreign slave trade and the 
expansion of the U.S. created more demand. This led to higher overhead costs where 
factory owners used their own slaves. Thus, by the 1850’s southern factories began 
hiring both free blacks and women.
24
 It just became cheaper to hire wage earners than 
to have expensive slaves do all the work. This same logic was in use when it came to the 
labor practices of Maryland and Virginia for mine work. Poor whites, often immigrants, 
were hired to do the work because it was so dangerous. If a mine collapsed with slaves 
in it, one lost considerably more capital than if wage earners were in the mine. Fear of 
losing capital ensured that many dangerous tasks throughout the South were reserved 
for poor whites and free blacks. They were simply more expendable.
25
 
For the U.S., slavery became the fork in the road where the country would split 
despite overwhelming homogeneity. Northerners invested their capital into factories to 
work the considerable amount of cotton coming from the South while southerners 
invested their capital into slaves to harvest ever increasing amounts of cotton. Many 
northerners came to resent the three-fifths clause, which they saw as perpetuating the 
“Virginia Dynasty” of the presidency. After all, the president had been from Virginia for 
thirty-two years of the first thirty-six years of the country. This was thanks largely to the 
                                                          
24
 Taylor, George Rogers. The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860. Harper Torchbooks. 1968. New York. 
292-93 
25
 Ibid, 292 
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three-fifths clause, which cost John Adams his re-election bid in 1800.
26
 For the 
slaveholding states, ensuring the institution of slavery was perpetuated became an all 
important concern, one that would prove worth risking the stability of the constitutional 
arrangement of the country, worth the uncertainty of re-coordinating. They saw the 
greater population of the North as a threat to slavery, fearing that the increasing 
population of the North would become enough to make the three-fifths clause a moot 
point. Such an event would allow the North to impose “economic policies contrary to 
Southern interests”.
27
 Considering how much capital was being put into slavery, this was 
no small fear on the part of slave-owners. 
As such, the fundamental conflict between these two regions centered largely on 
the expansion of slavery. If slavery expanded into the territories, opportunities for 
industry would be lost, as the economy would revolve around slavery instead of free 
labor. If slavery were not allowed into territories slave states would lose potential 
markets for the domestic slave trade and slave-owners would not be able to settle new 
territory where economic opportunities were perceived as more abundant. In the 
Northwest Territories, where both northern Yankees and southern Butternuts were 
settling, conflicts arose quickly. Northerners didn’t want to compete with slave for work 
and southerners wanted the institution to take root.
28
 As the U.S. expanded and new 
states entered the Union, both North and South began to fear being outnumbered by 
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27
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either free or slave states. This fear lead to such measures as the Missouri Compromise 
and the Compromise of 1850, both aimed at assuaging both North and South that the 
other one did not have the upper hand. Such compromises couldn’t last forever, though, 
as the South would eventually see it as being for the best to re-coordinate, to risk open 
war simply because a president known not to be a friend of slavery was elected. 
 These compromises may have even given the South more reason to risk re-
coordination, as they gave the South more time to invest in slaves, thus further 
attaching them to the institution, but that question is outside of the scope of this paper. 
What is certain is that in the years leading up to the Civil War slavery became the all 
important economic force for the South. Some regions relied on slavery for cotton 
production while other areas profited by selling their slaves in the domestic slave trade. 
Regardless of how the slaves were used, the South’s continued adherence to the 
Constitution became more reliant on its ability to predict the safety of slavery from 
Federal interference.  
The rise of party politics in the U.S. perhaps enabled the South to have a 
measure of security that helped stave off secession for a number of years. In the 1820’s 
Martin Van Buren sought to create a strong national party centered on Andrew Jackson. 
To create such a party, though, one would need to control the federal patronage 
system, by which party discipline could be controlled through rewards, i.e. 
appointments to government positions.
29
 With Jackson’s and his fellow Democrats’ 
                                                          
29
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electoral victories in the 1828 election, this spoils system was instituted and a strong 
national party was born under the Democrat’s banner. 
The Democratic Party began using conventions to select the presidential 
nominee of the Party, marking a shift from previous practices where an unorganized 
group of individuals would select a nominee. This new method of selection ensured that 
the party stayed strong, as only those agreeable to the majority of the party would be 
selected to run.
30
Southern states initially had concerns about this method of selection, 
though, as the nomination process was put into fewer and fewer hands to ensure that 
the nomination process was diluted by too many competing interests. They found 
comfort in the fact that convention rules required “two-thirds of the whole number of 
votes in the convention…to constitute a choice”.
31
 This measure was designed to ensure 
that any candidate chosen would appeal to the most delegates, thus ensuring regional 
viability, something necessary for a strong national party. It also gave the South an 
effective veto on any candidate seeking the highest office in the land, as one could not 
receive the Democratic nomination without the South’s support.
32
 
This system ultimately allowed the South to ensure that any president chosen to 
run would be proslavery, or at the very least not an abolitionist. But this alliance 
between the northern and southern Democrats could not last forever, as regional 
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differences concerning slavery would fracture the Democrats’ national coalition. The 
shatter point of this coalition proved to be the admission of Kansas as a state in 1857. 
For years up to that point outright battle had been waged between Free Soilers and 
border ruffians over whether Kansas would be a free state or a slave state. 1857 was the 
year where the state constitution would be drafted in Lecompton and submitted to 
Congress for approval. Proslavery residents, who dominated the state legislature due to 
rigged elections, recognized that they were outnumbered two to one. They did 
everything in their power to ensure an outcome favorable to slavery, such as ensuring 
only proslavery individuals would be in charge of voter registration and ballot areas. 
Furthermore, they hoped to submit the state constitution to Congress without a public 
referendum. Such a course of action ran contrary to the Kansas-Nebraska Act which 
required a referendum to approve any state constitution. Said act was inspired by the 
principle of popular sovereignty, popularized by northern Democrats, for determining 
whether a state was free or allowed slavery. Free Soilers, though, refused to vote in 
such an obviously fraudulent election to determine the delegates, and so all proslavery 
men went to the convention.
33
 
Senator Stephen Douglas, the one who popularized the idea of popular 
sovereignty, and President Buchanan, along with other northern Democrats, found the 
proceedings in Kansas to be disturbing. They demanded that the Lecompton 
constitution be submitted to the public in a referendum before it be sent to Congress, 
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contrary to the wishes of the pro-slavery forces. The convention acquiesced, but only 
submitted the parts of the constitution concerning slavery for a public vote. The 
problem with this measure, from a Free Soilers’ perspective, was that the version of the 
constitution with no slavery only prevented future importation of slaves, saying nothing 
of the slaves already in the territory. This was quite vexing for Free Soilers, who knew 
full well that other slave states had such provisions in place that were completely 
ignored by state officials. Again, the Free Soilers refused to vote for what they saw as a 
lose-lose scenario, and the version allowing slavery was ratified via referendum. 
Buchanan, fearing southern secession or revolt within the Democratic Party, changed 
positions on the Lecompton constitution at this time, and vowed to endorse whatever 
version came before Congress.
34
 
Northern Democrats, led by Douglas, could not support the Lecompton 
constitution that arrived before Congress and hope to survive politically. Douglas, who 
had presidential aspirations in the 1860 election, knew he would have received the 
Democratic nomination if he supported the Lecompton constitution. Doing so, though, 
would have ultimately cost him the election as the proceedings in Kansas were 
immensely unpopular in the North and Northwest. So while the Lecompton constitution 
passed through the Southern dominated Senate it failed to pass the House thanks in 
large part to the lack of support the constitution received from northern Democrats.
35
 
Two years later as the Democratic convention in Charleston saw Southerners, still upset 
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with what they saw as a betrayal over the Lecompton constitution, insist upon a slave 
code for the territories plank. The more numerous northern delegates voted against this 
plank, as it was unpalatable to northern constituencies. As they planned to do should 
this happen (which they knew would), the southerners walked out of the convention. 
They later held their own convention to select a candidate to run against Douglas, who 
had won the nomination after the southerner’s left the party.
36
 
By splitting the Democratic vote, it was all but assured that a Republican would 
be elected in 1860. This wasn’t an unexpected outcome amongst southerners, nor was it 
entirely unwanted. Many saw the election of a Republican to the presidency as the 
beginning of a new era for the South, an independent era. Such an election would allow 
southerners to secede from the Union in order to protect their property rights, namely 
their slaves. During the convention, southerners had reminded their northern 
counterparts that it was their “institutions which are at stake; ours is the property to be 
destroyed”.
37
 With the dissolution of the Democratic coalition over Kansas, southerners 
lost the security that slavery would be protected within the Union. Re-coordination 
became not only less costly in their eyes, but cost saving, as it would help secure all of 
the capital that had been poured into slavery over the years. All they needed was an 
excuse, an affront, and the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 gave them one. 
Not all slave states, however, found the costs to be sufficiently low to risk re-
coordination. There is strong evidence that those states that did rebel did so in large 
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part because of their stronger economic attachment to slavery. For instance, Maryland, 
like Virginia, found itself in a similar position early in the 19
th
 century; it possessed an 
excess number of slaves. Due to its location, Maryland had no way to expand its borders 
westward and thus diffuse the black population. Such realities left Maryland with two 
options for dealing with its large slave population: sell them or free them. The people of 
Maryland opted, for the most part, to free their slaves. By 1810 20 percent of the slave 
population had been freed, 50 percent by the Civil War.
38
 This was not a state that had a 
heavy interest in perpetuating slavery, so it should come as no surprise that Maryland 
did not try to secede.  
When looking at the proportion of slavery in the states that rebelled compared 
to the Border States that did not, the data becomes compelling. The Border States had a 
free black population of more than 21 percent, compared to less than 2 percent in the 
Deep South.  46 percent of the entire free black southern population resided in the 
Border States and only 12 percent of enslaved southern blacks lived in the Border 
States. 55 percent of southern slaves lived in the Deep South. These figures begin to tell 
us about three distinct regions in the South, what William Freehling refers to as the 
Upper (Border) South, Middle South, and Lower (Deep) South. What differentiates these 
regions is their respective attachment to slavery.
39
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The Border states, which included Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri, 
focused mostly on grain as their primary cash crop as opposed to cotton, which wasn’t 
suited to the climate in those states. Furthermore, much like their northern neighbors 
industry was growing at a considerable rate in the Borders states. By the start of the 
Civil War, they contained more than half of the whole South’s industrial capability.
40
 As 
mentioned before, factories over time were replacing slaves with wage earners 
throughout the South, so any shift in capital towards industry would have had a 
negative impact on the strength of slavery in that region. For this region, the possibility 
of re-coordinating would have had less sway as more capital was being shifted towards 
industry and not towards the purchase of slaves to work plantations. Thus, they would 
have less to lose if slavery were abolished. A sampling of the periodicals from St. Louis 
resembled those of Chicago more so than Charleston in regards to slavery. 
41
 
Of course the Border States’ proximity to the Union armies cannot be 
overlooked when discussing re-coordination costs. Such facts surely raised the costs of 
re-coordination sufficiently high so as to prevent secession. But if one looks at the 
potential benefits of secession one sees that the lack of attachment to slavery for these 
regions was an unsuitable impetus to cause secession in the first place. These states had 
the fewest slaves and had a burgeoning industrial area that benefited wage labor as 
opposed to slave labor; risking re-coordination for slavery when you are moving along a 
path contrary to it is not worthwhile. 
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The Middle States, which include Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and 
Arkansas, each contained elements of both the Border States and Deep South. These 
elements were based largely on the efficacy of plantation farming and slavery. For 
instance, plantations were much more practical in Eastern Virginia than in the 
Appalachian hills of western Virginia. As such, slavery had a much weaker presence in 
what would become West Virginia during the Civil War.
42
 For those living in West 
Virginia, re-coordination was not worthwhile, as secession would provide few tangible 
benefits for a people who had no attachment to slavery. In fact, splitting from the rest 
of the state was a better option, as it allowed them to pursue policies more in line with 
their own economic realities.  
This pattern of attachment revealed itself again in Tennessee, where the 
Appalachian Mountains cut into the eastern part of the state. As a result, slavery never 
really took hold in the hills of Tennessee. When the Civil War broke out, Tennessee was 
sharply divided between East and West, with the East furnishing as many as 31,000 
soldiers for the Union armies.
43
 A few East Tennessee counties even continued to send 
representatives to Washington. Senator Andrew Johnson of East Tennessee also refused 
secession and continued to serve in Washington during the war.
44
 Furthermore, those in 
the east held a convention in Greeneville to try and foster secession from the rest of the 
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state.
45
 Clearly, this was a region where the benefits of re-coordination were hotly 
disputed and given the devastation that visited Tennessee one can say in hindsight that 
those in the east were right. 
In these lands split by their attachment to slavery we begin to see concrete 
evidence that slavery was sufficiently important to risk re-coordination. Areas that had a 
strong attachment to slavery were willing to risk instability by leaving the Union the 
Constitution had created while regions less attached were not as willing. Such a pattern 
can even be seen in the Deep South, the heart of slavery. For instance, a small portion of 
South Carolina is covered by the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains, making the 
area particularly poor for plantations and slavery. From this area sprang up considerable 
hostility towards slave-owners further east from time to time, especially during the Civil 
War. Georgia and Alabama also have significant foothills towards their northern borders 
and these areas were also hotbeds of dissatisfaction with the Confederacy during the 
war.
46
 
The Deep South, which includes South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, did undoubtedly have the strongest attachment to 
slavery of the three regions. Having more tropical climates suitable for the production of 
cotton, good soil, and fairly flat land for the most part slavery was able to grow 
unperturbed. This unchecked growth was only further assisted by the considerable 
distance between the Free states and the Deep South. This meant that the lax 
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enforcement of the fugitive slave laws by Free states didn’t affect their capital nearly as 
much as the Middle States and especially the Border States. Thus, they had added 
security that their invested capital would be returned to them.
47
 Therefore it is not 
surprising that the most fervent secessionists came from this region.  
Furthermore, the sheer number of slaves in the region meant said states would 
have a strong attachment to slavery as 47 percent of the total population of this region 
consisted of slaves. Not only did this statistic lend itself to increased fears of racial 
conflict, of which more will be said later, but it also meant that considerable capital was 
tied to these slaves. The Border States, by comparison, had only 17 percent of its 
population made up of slaves, meaning racial conflict was less likely and more 
importantly less was invested in slavery. The Middle states had 30 percent of their total 
population made up of slaves. While this might not seem like a large figure, it is best to 
remember that these numbers were highly concentrated in certain regions of states, 
thus giving certain areas more reason to fear abolition.
48
 
The U.S., while incredibly homogenous ethnically during the course of the 19
th
 
century, diverged regionally over economic systems, namely the use of slaves. The 
South became more and more attached to the institution while it disappeared 
altogether in the North. So strong was this attachment to the institution that once the 
South felt it could no longer ensure slavery’s safety they decided re-coordination was a 
better option than continuing to operate in the constitutional framework. Staying in the 
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Union simply wasn’t in their best interest. Those southern states with weaker 
attachments to slavery were not as quick to consider Re-coordination. Tennessee, after 
all, was the last state to secede.
49
 There was much to risk and less benefit in seeking re-
coordination. For the Deep South, though, there was too much to risk by staying. In the 
next section, we will examine how the transportation revolution of the 19
th
 century 
helped create cohesive identities in both the North and the South and how these 
identities affected the costs of re-coordination. 
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The Transportation Revolution and Its Impact on Social Distance 
  
During the 19
th
 century America underwent an incredible transformation as first 
canals and then railroads sprang up throughout the country. This Transportation 
Revolution changed the country and its people in profound ways, both economically and 
socially. Such advancements both greatly reduced the costs and time of traveling, not 
only helping the nation expand but bringing the nation together in new ways as well. 
This Transportation Revolution, though, contributed in many ways to the alienation of 
the South and the North, as it increased the sense of competition between the two 
regions, further pushing the “us” versus “them” mentality that would dominate the 
nation by the outbreak of the Civil War. Furthermore, the South and North did not 
become increasingly economically integrated during this time despite the emergence of 
new transportation methods. As a result, the costs of re-coordination for the South 
were not increased thanks to canals and rails. 
 How transportation raises the costs of re-coordination becomes the next 
important question in this discussion. Transportation can increase the cost of re-
coordination largely because it can reduce social distance between far-flung groups. 
Social distance is lower when those who are socially close (interact with one another) 
feel closer to each other. In other words, there is a feeling of a shared identity. 
Conversely, social distance is higher when people have few interactions with one 
31 
 
another, making them feel more distant from each other.
50
 
51
 It is important to note that 
social distance is not always related to spatial distance (although it can be depending on 
the circumstances). Rather, it deals with a perception of distance, possibly stemming 
from a variety of reasons, such as class, economic status, or ethnicity. There are many 
dimensions of social distance, but for the purposes of this paper we shall be examining 
social distance and how it helps groups develop an understanding of “who does not 
belong to their own group”.
52
 As the evidence shall show, those in the South 
increasingly saw those in the Northeast and Northwest (collectively the North) as the 
“other” and vice versa.  
 When it comes to social distance, a sense of alienation between different groups 
is not always guaranteed. After all, just because two groups are different does not mean 
that they will necessarily come to view each other as alien. In order for alienation to 
occur, there must first be competition between different groups for resources. With 
competition, groups begin to see each other as rivals, as those who would prevent 
access to essential resources. Whether it be competition for land, political power, or 
employment opportunities, competition helps groups create and maintain distinctions, 
distinctions that help create feelings of alienation. Perceiving another group as the 
“other” in turn lowers the costs of re-coordination, as the possibility of viewing a 
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constitutional arrangement with an alien group as costly becomes more likely. After all, 
why compete with a group for resources when you could simply exclude them from the 
competition through re-coordination? The greater the sense of competition, the re-
coordination becomes. 
Again, just because there is competition amongst groups doesn’t mean that 
group interactions will necessarily become hostile. Certain preconditions must be met in 
order for the relationship to become hostile through competition for political and/or 
economic power. The first precondition is that “competing groups must be relatively 
free to pursue the same goals”.  Short of some barrier keeping one group from 
adequately competing for the same things, groups have a higher chance of disliking each 
other. For instance, in the North blacks were looked on with disdain as rivals for work, 
whereas in the South, where slavery kept blacks in chains, they were not viewed as 
rivals to nearly the same extent.
53
 
54
 
 This sort of competition certainly existed between northern and southern states, 
particularly when looking at the settlement of the territories. Both regions knew that 
whoever reached a majority in a territory first would control whether the state was a 
slave state or a free state. The history of this competition for territory dated back to the 
settlement of the Northwest, as both southern slaveholders and northern settlers 
flocked to the region, leading to bitterness between the two groups over whether the 
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future state would allow slavery. There were powerful interests behind both sides in this 
region increasingly willing to do whatever it took to ensure a territory was a free state or 
a slave state.  
Northern land speculators wanted the territories to be free, as this increased the 
value of the land. With free labor, owning land becomes more profitable as permanent 
settlements are needed to house workers. If slavery were allowed, though, land 
becomes much less valuable. Slaveholders owned their labor forces and could move 
them wherever they desired at any time. This is why settlements in the South were 
widely dispersed, as there was no need for large settlements to house labor.
55
 In 1824 
an effort was made in Illinois to amend the state constitution to legalize slavery in the 
state. The vote was close, but the measure ultimately failed by a vote of 6,600 to 
5,000.
56
 As the years went by, such competition only became more bitter and violent, as 
the events of Bleeding Kansas and later the controversy over the Lecompton 
constitution demonstrates. Clearly, there was competition between North and South 
over land and political power. That competition was creating a rift between the two that 
allowed them to see the other as increasingly alien. 
Having the same opportunity to obtain the same things, though, is not the only 
precondition necessary to create a hostile relationship between two groups. Most 
importantly, the groups must have a “cohesive and solidaristic” relationship amongst 
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themselves.
57
 A cohesive identity helps lower the costs of re-coordination. If a group of 
likeminded people know there is a significant number of people who would support 
secession, secession becomes that much easier by reducing some of the uncertainty 
inherent in re-coordination. If there are many factions within each group, each with 
their own agendas, it will be hard for a group to present a united front on any one issue. 
In the case of North and South, such solidarity certainly did exist. In the South, this 
solidarity came through a commitment to maintaining and extending slavery and also a 
system of social controls for poor whites, as will be discussed in the next section. The 
North also remained highly unified not only regarding opposition to slavery but also in 
custom and manner as well. 
Such solidarity came about not just because of social mores but because of the 
Transportation Revolution which enabled highly cohesive identities to form, identities 
that were maintained despite great distance between their members. To illustrate this 
point, it helps to first look at the changes brought about by the Transportation 
Revolution in order to fully appreciate how a cohesive identity was maintained amongst 
northerners. At the turn of the 19
th
 century, travel over land was difficult due to few 
good roads, making overland trade particularly expensive. The presence of the 
Appalachians, an imposing, natural barrier between the east and west, was the main 
culprit for this difficulty. These mountains made road construction incredibly expensive 
and time consuming. Despite these difficulties, though, the U.S. did have an 
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interconnected network of rivers by which goods could be transported. For this reason, 
many early farms and towns in the U.S. were established within a few miles of a river, so 
as to bear a harvest or goods to market.
58
  
Still, this method was hardly ideal, as river navigation was limited to bringing 
goods downriver alone. Upriver navigation was difficult at best due to “swift currents, 
shallow water, narrow, winding channels, or high banks and forests which broke the 
wind”. Thus, makeshift rafts were used to bear harvests and other goods to market, 
which would later be broken down for lumber at the end of the trip.
59
 A further 
difficulty was obviously the limitations of natural rivers. One could not just settle 
anywhere, as access to rivers was necessary for transporting goods. Thus, good land was 
passed over for land that was closer to rivers. Tough overland travel was not just limiting 
travel, but was limiting settlement as well. 
Several developments occurred that greatly changed this picture of American 
life, the first of which was the canal boom. The canal boom began with the completion 
of the Erie Canal in 1817. Spurred largely by New York’s governor DeWitt Clinton, the 
canal stretched from Albany to Buffalo, traveling 364 miles. Before the canal was built, 
most of the territory between these two cities was wilderness. When the canal was 
officially opened in 1823 one could now move goods across New York with much ease.
60
 
This canal finally allowed people to settle previously untamed areas, as people moved 
                                                          
58
 Taylor, 56 
59
 Ibid, 56-57 
60
 Ibid, 33-34 
36 
 
into the areas near the canal in great numbers. With greater reassurance that their own 
wares could make it to markets without losing profits to expensive overland 
transportation, settlement in the once wild region became more desirable.
61
 
Furthermore, the Erie Canal was a financial success well before it was fully completed in 
1823. 1819 saw increasing traffic along the completed sections, traffic that helped pay 
off the project before through toll collection. By 1825 the Erie and Champlain tolls 
brought in over half a million dollars, and by 1835 New York decided it needed to 
enlarge the canal to accommodate all the traffic.
62
 
Many states, impressed with the success of the Erie Canal, launched their own 
projects. The state of Ohio created a canal to link Lake Erie and Cleveland to the Ohio 
River and Cincinnati.
63
New England built the Blackstone Canal to connect the isolated 
region around Worcester to eastern Massachusetts.
64
 The Delaware and Hudson Canal 
stretched from Honesdale in Northern Pennsylvania to the Delaware River, mostly for 
the transportation of anthracite, making transportation of the fuel to New York and 
New England cities considerably cheaper.
65
 One of the most important and profitable 
canals built during this time was the Oswego canal, an offshoot of the Erie Canal. This 
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offshoot connected Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, making it so one could travel from New 
York to as far away as Toledo in a fraction of the time it would have ordinarily taken.
66
 
This shift in transportation had a considerable effect on the lives of the 
Americans in the affected regions. As mentioned previously, people had traditionally 
lived close to natural waterways, but canals gave them more options when it came to 
settling. Furthermore, the canal boom affected the way people interacted with the 
economy. For instance, in New York those few who had already lived in the wilderness 
that the Erie Canal would one day cut through lived a more self-sufficient existence, as 
poor roads plus tolls made overland travel too expensive to plant harvests for markets.
67
 
With the canals, though, transporting agricultural goods was not only easier but much 
cheaper as well. This allowed farmers to make better profits on their harvests, which 
allowed them to buy better equipment, such as iron plows and scythes. Cash also 
became more widespread in these regions. This allowed for the use of currency in 
everyday transactions as opposed to the informal bartering system, which had existed in 
such areas.
68
 
With these changes, people became more consumerist than ever before. Canals 
allowed the transportation costs of luxury items, such as clocks and fine clothes, to 
become greatly reduced.
69
 Having better access to markets allowed people to become 
more market driven as well, and less concerned with subsistence farming. Thus, people 
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had more money to buy the things that one could not provide for oneself. This is why 
farmers became more specialized in the northeast and northwest, as they increasingly 
grew harvests for sale.
70
 This helped the people of the northeast and northwest develop 
a cohesive identity, as they became more reliant upon one another not just for basic 
necessities but for things they desired. These two regions are where an interconnected, 
national economy began to take shape. This interconnectedness also made them more 
reliant on one another. In short, increasing levels of economic dependence raises the 
cost of re-coordination. By becoming more dependent on other groups, a group’s ability 
to leave a coordination system decreases. After all, if re-coordinating means you might 
not be able to get adequate goods to sustain a population re-coordination is not a 
sensible option. 
When railroads began to appear in 19
th
 century America these effects were only 
magnified. Railroads, first showing market viability in Europe during the late 1820’s, 
grew quickly in the U.S. thanks to cheap land and a lack of stringent border concerns, 
America was able to surpass Europe quickly in railroad construction. By 1840, the U.S. 
had almost twice as many miles of track laid compared to Europe, putting the U.S. at an 
estimated 3,000 miles.
71
 These railroads provided a way for the relatively limited 
transportation industry to escape natural restrictions. Canals, for all their benefits, were 
still limited in where they could be built, needing prodigious amounts of water from 
                                                          
70
 Howe, 567 
71
 Taylor, 74 
39 
 
nearby water sources to fill the canals. Railroads, though, could be built anywhere 
investors had a desire to do so. 
Another advantage the railroads had over the canals was their speed. Canal 
boats averaged just two miles an hour, traveling about 24 miles in a day.
72
 This may not 
seem quick by today’s standards, but traveling such a distance was a huge improvement 
over land travel. Prior to the advent of canals, if one wanted freight shipped from 
Cincinnati to New York City it would take over 50 days for your cargo to reach its final 
destination. By canal, the same freight would take just 18 days to arrive. Railroads, 
though, were even faster than canals. Typically traveling 10 miles per hour, they could 
travel 120 miles in a day. Transporting the same freight from Cincinnati to New York City 
would take a train 6 to 8 days.
73
 Clearly, the country was becoming much smaller with 
such changes in transportation. 
Railroads overcame canals in importance in the U.S. thanks largely to how cheap 
they were for transportation. As mentioned previously, land for railroads was purchased 
for little, so those savings could be passed on to customers. Furthermore, railroads in 
the U.S. used wood for fuel, which was a considerably cheap fuel source given the great 
abundance of trees in the U.S. Railroads also avoided other heavy costs that European 
railroads could not, such as building fences along the rails to keep livestock off the 
tracks. Instead, cowcatchers were designed and installed to reduce any damage 
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livestock might inflict on the trains.
74
 All of this made the railroads potentially much 
more affordable, not to mention dynamic, than canals. As a result, several states tried to 
enact strict regulations against railroads that competed with state funded canals. For 
instance, New York State “required railroads paralleling the Erie to pay tolls equal to 
those assessed on the canal and forbade the carrying freight by such railroads except 
during the winter, when canal traffic was suspended”.
75
 
All of these innovations helped reduce the cost of transportation throughout the 
northeast and northwest, making the people in these regions a more cohesive whole. A 
greater sense of an “Us” was developing between these two regions as people became 
more connected in this emerging national economy. Social distance was being reduced 
gradually as farms moved away from being merely self-sufficient towards becoming 
commercially minded. This shift towards commerce thanks to the Transportation 
Revolution ensured that Americans felt closer to each other despite the real distance 
between them. Such a cohesive sense of self was not just a result of economic 
integration though. Railroads, in order to beat competition with river travel by 
steamboats and canals, drastically reduced fares for passenger travel. In the 1850’s the 
Hudson River Railroad charged as little as one cent a mile for passengers.
76
 This allowed 
not just freight to be shipped around the country in an inexpensive manner but people 
as well. 
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This is not to say, though, that Americans were traveling in large numbers from 
Massachusetts to Illinois on holiday. Rather, people from the northeast were flocking to 
the northwest for settlement thanks largely to easier and inexpensive travel. The early 
canals, which connected the two regions, allowed settlers from the east to move in by 
water instead of crossing the Appalachians.
77
 So if people weren’t traveling a lot for 
personal enjoyment, but rather for settlement, how is social distance reduced? After all, 
once two groups separate there is a greater likelihood that they will become socially 
distant as a result of different emerging needs and cultures. So why did the northeast 
and northwest have reduced social distance in the long run? The answer lays in the 
increased speed that news and traveled.
78
 
Information is a powerful thing, capable of uniting people, making them whole 
rather than separate parts. As new patterns of developing, storing and distributing 
information become available, new social interactions and structures become available 
as well.
79
 Put simply, as the ability to communicate information over greater distances 
increases, the larger the sphere is that helps define an “us”. With the changes in 
transportation during the 19
th
 century, it became possible for people in the northeast to 
be socially connected with the people of the northwest and vice versa. Settlers in Ohio 
could write letters to relations in Massachusetts and expect a quick response. People in 
Illinois could learn of events back in New York, such as parades, days after they 
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happened instead of weeks, perhaps months. This meant that such news, whether 
through personal communiqués or news media, seemed as though they were not some 
far off events happening to distant strangers. Rather, they were nearby events 
happening to people, possibly family you keep in touch with, who provided most of your 
meat or grain.  
During this time, the northeast and northwest became a more cohesive “us” 
because of the Northwest’s proximity to the slave states. This proximity made it easier 
for many slaveholders to settle in the Northwest Territories, bringing their slaves with 
them in the process. Such actions helped galvanize the northeastern settlers who 
opposed slavery, as it presented them with obvious competition. With the increased 
speed of news, people back in the northeast were made aware of tensions in a way that 
was impossible before the advent of the Transportation Revolution. Slavery wasn’t 
something far away affecting someone else; it was something close by affecting your 
brother’s family in Ohio or land values in Illinois. Because of things like canals and 
railroads the far-flung Free states, despite varying levels of proximity to the slave states, 
were able to maintain a low level of social distance and thus were able to feel the 
effects of competition with proslavery settlers, thus helping them maintain a high level 
of cohesion. 
Furthermore, decreased travel time also ensured that northerners and 
southerners would also find themselves competing with one another for land. As 
mentioned previously, decreased travel time for people mostly benefitted settlers, 
43 
 
making settlement of faraway lands considerably easier. This meant that geographic 
proximity to virgin territory was no longer the main factor in deciding whether a 
territory would be a free state or a slave state. The battle over Kansas is a perfect 
example of this. With slave states in greater proximity to the territory, with two slave 
states on its eastern border no less, Kansas became populated with a majority of Free 
Soilers thanks in large part to improved transportation. 
A lot has been said of why the northeast and northwest became more cohesive 
as the years went by. This showed us how two regions, despite separation by significant 
geographic distance, were able to build and maintain a cohesive identity. Now the South 
must be examined to see why the same level of cohesion did not grow between slave 
states and their northern neighbors. Slavery is, not surprisingly, the root cause of this 
divergence. Granted, there was always going to be some sense of competition with the 
Free states simply because of slavery. But that doesn’t explain why the South was not 
benefiting from reduced social distance with the North due to increasing economic 
integration. This economic integration did not happen on the same level as in the North, 
though, largely because the South did not experience the Transportation Revolution to 
the same extent as the North. Perhaps if the Transportation Revolution had connected 
the North and South economically the difficulties of this competition could have been 
overlooked and the Civil War have been put off for even longer. Slavery, unsurprisingly, 
lies at the heart of why social distance wasn’t reduced between North and South 
through economic integration.  
44 
 
It is important to note that the South did indeed construct rails during this 
period. From 1820 to 1860, the southern slave states contained a little over a third of 
the nation’s rails.
80
 The difference is that these rails, for the most part, connected 
southern cities and states as opposed to linking North and South. There were 
exceptions, of course, as one could travel from New York to North Carolina almost 
continuously by rail, with only a few areas where one would need to take some other 
form of transportation for a time.
81
  This line, however, was not used primarily to ship 
freight; it primarily carried passengers. Earnings from passenger transportation earned 
this rail four million dollars while freight only brought in two million for the year 1859.
82
 
As discussed previously, people were not taking holidays around the country in mass 
numbers during this period, so these figures most likely represent people traveling 
locally to visit relations within their own state. This hypothesis seems more likely given 
the increasingly xenophobic attitude of southerners toward Yankees and foreigners, 
particularly in the years up to the Civil War, of which more will be discussed in the next 
section. So while such a rail theoretically could have served as a solidifying force 
nationally, it most likely only reduced social distance within southern states rather than 
nationally. 
 The rails in place in the South would have allowed for the same broadening of 
social identity that the North experienced. For the South, though, that identity would 
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have been tied up in slavery and the threat of a closer northern threat. Southerners, 
despite not being geographically close to the territories, would have felt closer to the 
conflicts in the territories than they would have otherwise if not for improvements in 
transportation. Thanks to the rails, a slave-owner in South Carolina could feel closer to a 
slave-owner in Kansas and thus express moral indignation at a perceived abrogation of 
his fellow planter’s rights to own slaves. 
The building of rails in the South, though, was limited for several reasons. When 
the Transportation Revolution began with the Canal Boom, venture capital was scarce in 
the United States. This was a significant problem facing developers, as the capital 
necessary for a proper canal “was seldom less than a million and might be five times 
that sum”.
83
 This meant that anyone hoping to build a canal would have need of 
borrowing significant amounts of capital. Many companies turned to the Federal 
government for aid in their construction efforts, only to find their requests ultimately 
stymied by southerners such as Nathaniel Macon and John Randolph. Southern 
members of both the House and Senate opposed internal improvement measures being 
funded by the Federal government, viewing such actions as an enlargement of Federal 
power over the economy.
84
 Such a power, over time, could extend to slavery in their 
minds. “If Congress possesses the power to do what is proposed in this bill [fund a canal] 
they may emancipate every slave in the United States.”
85
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As a result, companies sought, and often found, their funding from the state 
governments. In many cases this funding ensured that the state involved would own 
and operate a canal. Even in those instances where a private company owned the canal, 
public financing was still used to get the projects started.
86
 In the South, though, such 
funding was harder to come by. Plantation owners, who held political power if not 
political office in the South, preferred low taxes by the state and by extension low 
activity. This helped them maintain the appearance of a Patrician who acted as a 
benefactor not just to slaves but to poor whites as well. Thus, it was harder for Southern 
states to appropriate the funding through taxes for internal improvements. 
Furthermore, in 1819 the cotton bubble burst. After the War of 1812, the U.S. became 
the leading supplier of cotton for the British Empire, with cotton exports totaling 39 
percent of all U.S. exports.
87
 By 1819, though, Britain had recovered from the 
Napoleonic Wars and was able to once again produce most of its foodstuffs. The 
demand for cotton, spurred on by those same wars, began to rapidly exceed demand in 
European factories. This sparked a series of events that left many states in serious 
financial debt, seeming to confirm the suspicions of many southern critics of public 
funding for transportation.
88
 Better to invest in slaves than in transportation. 
The Southern experience with railroads also reinforced this way of thinking. The 
Panic of 1839, which spanned from 1839 to 1843, had a devastating impact on rail 
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construction throughout the country. The capital necessary for tasks such as laying rail 
dried up, leaving many railroad companies in debt. The South experienced the same 
problems when it came to rail construction. Over 90 miles of completed tracks fell into 
disuse as the rail company that owned them went bankrupt. These tracks were not even 
taken over by another company, instead being scuttled for the scrap iron. Those 
railroads that were still under construction in the South were often left uncompleted 
and were poached for the iron as well.
89
 This left the South decidedly less economically 
integrated with the rest of the country because there were fewer rails connecting the 
South and the North. As a result, there was less potential to build a sense of cohesion 
with the North. 
Economic hardships were not the only reason a truly national rail system failed 
to materialize, one which possibly could have served as a solidifying force between the 
North and South. One obstacle in the way of such a goal was the lack of standard gauge 
system for the railroads. Different gauge sizes meant continuous rail travel would be 
next to impossible, as trains could not transfer to new lines. This helped railroad 
companies keep monopolies on their rail’s route. As a result, the further one wanted 
freight shipped by rail the more costly it would be as goods would need to be 
transferred repeatedly to other lines.
90
 Such measures certainly had an impact on the 
desire of slave-owners to ship their cotton north from the Deep South by rail. 
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Furthermore, it was not as though the South had no other alternatives when it 
came to shipping goods. For southerners, there was always the option of shipping things 
by sea. In fact, southern states relied primarily upon shipping goods via the ocean 
because such transportation was cheap and convenient, particularly for the Deep South 
states. Ocean transportation was often cheaper because many of the shipping charges, 
such as loading charges and commissions, were fixed prices no matter how far the 
freight would be shipped. Railroads, by contrast, often charged different rates 
depending on how far something was going to travel. Given the lack of a national 
transportation system, freight would need to travel along different rails, leading to 
increasing costs along the way. For this reason, all of the cotton New England received 
from the South came by seafaring vessels prior to the Civil War.
91
  
Transporting goods by sea did not lend itself to the South developing a sense of 
cohesion with the North. Shipping cotton to the North by sea was not far off from 
shipping cotton to Europe. In fact, Europe was a more important market for southern 
cotton than the North, as two-thirds of the cotton crop was exported to the more 
established textile factories of Britain. 
92
 While the Northeast and Northwest were 
becoming more integrated economically, the South remained economically independent 
because of its shipping methods. From this divergence of economic interests we see the 
South becoming a cohesive “us” compared to a northern “them”. As the north 
continued to industrialize, members of Congress, led by Henry Clay, increasingly sought 
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protective tariffs to ensure their products would have an advantage over foreign goods. 
Spurred by the Panic of 1819, protectionists sought to reduce British economic 
hegemony and also to insulate the U.S. from the turbulence of foreign markets in what 
would be called the American System.
93
 
Such measures, designed to promote domestic industry, had little appeal to 
southerners because they had no interest in protecting domestic industry. Initial efforts 
to start textile factories in the South proved short lived, as slave-owners felt they could 
make higher profits if their slaves simply worked the fields. With most of that slave-
produced cotton going overseas, southern politicians naturally preferred free trade 
principles over protective tariffs. Their capital was tied up in slaves and not factories 
after all. They were right when they saw protective tariffs as being damaging to said 
investment as well. Such tariffs raised the price of coarse textiles, used to clothe slaves, 
which in turn led to decreasing demand for Southern cotton abroad. This in turn led to 
higher costs in maintaining slaves, as their coarse textile clothing now cost more.
94
 
While such tariffs may have been good for U.S. business, they were not so beneficial to 
southern slavery. 
Here we see how Southern slave states began to develop a sense of cohesion 
around slavery as an institution. They were the ones who were disadvantaged by tariffs, 
as the costs of maintaining their sizeable investment in slavery increased. Free trade 
obviously benefitted them, as they had no significant textile or manufacturing interests 
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of their own to protect. They wanted to be able to trade with whoever they wanted 
with little interference. The tariffs essentially put the South at odds with the North over 
the direction of the country, which in turn created greater social distance between the 
regions. Evidence of this can be seen by examining the importance of the Northwest and 
South as markets for goods made in the Northeast. Up to 1839, the South was by far 
more important than the Northwest as a market for goods from the Northeast. By the 
1850’s, though, the West had surpassed the South as an important market for 
consumption.
95
 
Within this conflict over tariffs, both of the elements necessary to create 
cohesive, and hostile, identities were present. First, the North and South were 
competitors over for the political power to shape the economic trajectory of the nation, 
either in favor of slavery or wage labor, in the territories. Second, both North and South 
had the same access to political system to shape the trajectory of the nation as a whole. 
Over time, this competition created cohesive identities for each region, identities that 
increased the social distance between the two regions.  With increased social distance 
between two regions, the costs of re-coordination are diminished. If you cannot 
sympathize with the ones you are in competition with, why bother competing in the first 
place? Re-coordination would seem less perilous for the Southern states, as they would 
have no one who voiced opposition to the ideals of slavery and free trade. Given the 
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amount of cotton sent overseas the costs of re-coordinating to avoid competition would 
have been considerably higher had the South sent most of its cotton north instead.  
  
52 
 
Slavery and Social Capital 
 
 With both North and South responsible for creating an “us” vs. “them” mentality 
it would be easy to conclude that both were equally responsible for the Civil War. Such a 
conclusion, though, ignores the social impact of slavery on the South, and how this 
impact also greatly reduced the cost of re-coordination for the South. True though it 
may be that these divergent economic paths may have led to dissolution of the Union 
eventually, in the years leading up to the Civil War it wasn’t the North where secession 
was oft discussed in earnest. While many northerners certainly felt that the South 
should just leave, the idea of the North re-coordinating, of leaving the Union, was still 
foreign to them. It was slavery’s impact on society in the South that ensured that re-
coordination wasn’t a foreign concept. 
 As discussed in the previous section, the South was able to develop a cogent 
identity thanks in part to economic interests. This identity is what led increasingly to the 
greater social distance between North and South. Another, more important, factor in 
the creation of this identity was slavery itself. The presence of chattel slavery, based 
entirely on race, created a stratified hierarchy in the South, with blacks at the bottom as 
slaves and whites at the top as patricians. This hierarchy, while encouraging stability, 
helped sow the seeds for class conflict and ultimately it was slavery that ensured those 
seeds never reached fruition. 
 To illustrate this point it is important to examine the social hierarchy of the 
South beginning with the top of the hierarchy, the “patricians”. These self-styled 
53 
 
“patricians” were the slaveholding elite of the South. The stratification of society was 
justified by these wealthy men using Enlightenment theory to reconcile such a hierarchy 
with republican, egalitarian principles. It was argued that in a republic only the best men 
should rule, while lesser individuals deferred to their superior judgment. Such a 
sentiment was fully compatible with slavery. It was commonly held at the time, not just 
in the South either, that virtuous leadership required financial independence. For 
Southerner’s, slavery was that mechanism that allowed a man to have the financial 
independence necessary to live a life of leisure, free of mundane concerns such as 
manual labor of any sort, where virtue could be honed.
96
 
 Such sentiments were only reinforced by the fact that blacks, as the 19
th
 century 
progressed, were increasingly viewed as an inferior people, naturally suited for slavery. 
In fact, having blacks as slaves was viewed as the most humane thing to be done for 
blacks by many southerners. “Our slaves, they often claimed, permanently work for 
paternalistic masters, while wage slaves temporarily work for selfish capitalists”.
97
 
Slavery wasn’t a bad thing for slaves, as they lived under selfless patricians who engaged 
in a sort of noblesse oblige towards the slaves, providing them with things they could 
not otherwise provide for themselves. 
 Of course, such sentiments brought about certain difficulties that slaveholders 
needed to address. For instance, as the above quote demonstrates, slaves were seen as 
better off than “wage slaves” because they had someone who actually cared about their 
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well-being. The writings of George Fitzhugh, a 19
th
 century supporter of slavery, went so 
far as to call for “universal social subordination”, where all inferior individuals would be 
completely subordinate to their superiors. Logically, then, shouldn’t all “wage slaves” be 
made actually slaves so they might live under a more hospitable condition?
98
  
Such a hierarchical society cannot easily avoid this question, especially in a 
country where democratic and egalitarian principles had been present since the 
founding. Many poor whites in slave states, for instance, were disenfranchised based on 
property qualifications centered on slavery. Such a state was justified with the ideas of 
deference and leadership that were built up by the hierarchy of a slave society.
99
 Poor 
whites, the same as slaves, were expected to defer to their “betters”. This occasionally 
led to tensions along class lines in the South, particularly among “white belt” regions 
where few blacks, both free and slave, lived. The tensions usually arose because of the 
practice of hiring out slaves for labor, as white laborers did not want to compete with 
slaves for work.
100
 
 The manner in which slaveholders dealt with such tension sometimes only 
helped fuel resentments, particularly in these “white-belt” regions. In state legislatures, 
where many slaveholders and those friendly to slavery unquestionably held sway, those 
speaking out against slavery in any way, even in terms of the competition of slaves with 
poor whites, were pushed aside. Furthermore, those friendly towards slavery “often 
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imperiously demanded that other [white-belt] democrats yield” to their superior 
leadership and experience. While such actions might be harsh, the slaveholders knew 
that such men, having no dreams of owning slaves and no reliance on slaveholders, 
didn’t see the same need for the social hierarchy.
101
 Thus they were not to be trusted or 
treated with the same respect due to other legislative members. 
 Such tension could not exist on the surface of a slave society without threatening 
the stability of that institution. Slaveholders needed the support of poor whites, needed 
them to ignore the obvious contradictions of such a society. If not, the social distance 
between slaveholders and poor whites would become increasingly greater over time, 
and a cohesive identity would be impossible. Such hierarchies allow “humans to deal in 
a routine and predictable manner with strangers and acquaintances outside their 
primary group”.
102
 While this certainly helps with stability, it does not help reduce social 
distance. After all, it would seem that it would be difficult for poor whites to form a 
common identity with someone perceived to be one’s better. 
So rigid were these divides that they could be compared to ethnic stratification, 
despite the fact that both slaveholders and poor whites were both Anglo-Saxon in 
ancestry for the most part. Such systems of ethnic stratification are often based on a 
type of “moral order” where the dominant group believes their advantages come from 
natural differences.
103
 As mentioned previously, the entire social hierarchy of the South 
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was built upon the idea that the most virtuous would lead. This virtue became 
something that was heritable, that was connected to a family, as Southern slaveholders 
practiced at being nobles. All the advantages that they received were earned by their 
superior moral standing, rewards for living a virtuous life. Poor whites were another 
breed whose position in the world was based upon personal failings rather than 
circumstance.  
Comparisons to ethnic stratification might seem farfetched, particularly as the 
two groups primarily being discussed are both white. Robert Putnam, though, says that 
perceived diversity isn’t just a result of skin tone. “Diversity itself can only be conceived 
in terms of socially constructed identities”.
104
 So long as the social hierarchy of the 
South created and maintained distinctions between poor whites and the slave-owning 
elites, diversity would be present. Said hierarchical system as described could only 
ensure that social distance remained significant as it “created and sustained” rigid 
classifications for people. Even with common interactions between members of 
different groups, even over the course of years, “feelings of apprehension and reserve” 
would still exist.
105
  
Social isolation would become more prevalent, as recent studies by Putnam have 
shown that perceived diversity or differences trigger social isolation, even amongst 
members of the same ethnic group or race. As illustrated previously, social hierarchies 
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like the one just described create a type of diversity, one based upon class where the 
differences between people are emphasized. In areas with high instances of social 
isolation, people have less confidence in local government and local leaders.
106
 Such a 
lack of confidence would undermine the entire hierarchy that slavery was centered 
upon. A cohesive identity would become all but impossible. Without such an identity, 
the collective action needed for re-coordination would become that much more costly, 
perhaps prohibitively so as people would become increasingly isolated from one 
another. Without a cohesive identity, re-coordination would have been highly unlikely. 
While the antebellum South was not able to completely do away with these class 
tensions, a cohesive identity did form amongst Southern whites of all classes. This 
happened because southern whites of all classes were able to create social capital 
amongst themselves. Social capital is what essentially reduces the costs for people to 
work together to accomplish something.
107
 Where there is considerable social capital, 
there is also low social distance, as social capital enables people to identify common 
goals. This in turn helps people create common, cohesive identities. Social capital helps 
ensure that re-coordination costs remain high amongst groups since social capital 
reduces social distance between people. 
There are two types of social capital, bonding and bridging, both of which were 
at play in the South. Bridging capital is what enables people who are different in some 
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way to come together in some significant way.
108
 Such capital was important for 
creating a cohesive identity amongst southern whites, as it enabled whites of all classes 
to see beyond their differences, to see a common goal. Prominent slaveholders held 
picnics and barbeques, inviting people of all classes, in a show of egalitarianism and 
solidarity with fellow whites. Furthermore, the economic realities of slavery helped 
bridge the gap between wealthy slaveholders and the middle-class.  
 
Doctors treated plantation slaves. Merchants marketed plantation staples. Editors sold 
proslavery newspapers. Bankers financed slave purchases. Proslavery clerics preached 
at slaves and slaveholders. The village bourgeoisie stood resolutely behind rural 
seigneurs.
109
 
 
The slave economy created bridging capital between slaveholders and non-slaveholders 
because both groups could see their economic interests tied to its continuation. 
Without slavery, many non-slaveholders could conceivably lose money or even their 
livelihoods. This bridging capital helped reduce social distance between different classes 
of whites. 
 The central importance of slavery for the economy also ensured that any 
individual seeking political office had to speak favorably on slavery.  
 
More lawyers than planters achieved political prominence in the Old South. Nothing 
would have changed if planters had held every office. In black-belt areas, anti-
abolitionist speeches paved the way to political success. Political prominence paved the 
road to legal success.
110
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Again, slaveholders and non-slaveholders found common ground, a bridge between the 
two that allowed them to work together in a mutually beneficial arrangement. Slavers 
ensured that politicians would be favorable towards slavery, and politicians ensured 
that they were successful not only politically but professionally as well, thus helping to 
reduce social distance once again. 
Poor whites as well found themselves tied to slavery. Slaveholders often 
supported poor whites economically, playing benefactor to their impoverished 
neighbors. With settlements in the South widely dispersed, sending harvests to market 
was expensive for farmers, sometimes even prohibitively so. For this reason poor whites 
often sold their produce to plantation owners who would in turn sell the produce for a 
profit. Plantation owners were more than happy to help, seeing such actions as part of 
the Patrician duty. This duty was not limited to just buying produce but extended to 
allowing poor whites to use their cotton gin or even putting them on their payroll.
111
 
Again, slavery helped bridge the gap between the two groups as both could recognize 
the benefits of slavery upon their lives regardless of whether one owned a slave or not. 
 The importance of bridging capital is not to be understated for creating a 
cohesive identity. Bridging capital is what “generates broader identities and reciprocity”, 
allowing people to empathize with others who may be different. These new, broad 
identities are how people reach out to other groups, find common ground where there 
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was none before.
112
 As a result, this bridging capital did much to deconstruct the rigid 
distinctions between whites of different classes by helping to reduce the perception of 
diversity between whites. Without bridging capital of any kind, the class tensions 
mentioned earlier would have been a serious barrier for any sort of collective action 
amongst southerners.  
 While these examples certainly demonstrate how differences were overcome 
through bridging capital it is impossible to ignore the limitations of such capital, 
particularly with poor whites. While poor whites may have understood that they too 
were connected to slavery, such a connection could also serve as a reminder of the 
difference between them and slave-owners. The institutional structure of slavery 
created the “rules of legitimate social action within which individuals and organizations 
compete for control over resources”.
113
 The norms created by the institution of slavery 
often served as reminders of the considerable gap that existed between the elite slave-
owners and poor whites. For instance, slave-owners looked down upon manual labor, 
seeing it as beneath the scope of a proper white man, fit only for slaves. Poor whites, 
though, made their living from such work.
114
 Such attitudes could, and did, lead to 
tension between the two groups, as they portrayed all who engaged in labor as inferior. 
So while bridging capital was important for easing class tensions it does not completely 
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explain how a cohesive identity was able to form between wealthy slave-owners and 
poor whites. 
 To explain how this cohesive identity was fully formed the bonding capital then 
present in the South needs to be examined. Bonding capital is what ties people who are 
alike together in a significant way.
115
 Whites in the south were able to find common 
ground simply because they were white and slaves were black. This is what tied them 
together. Class didn’t matter if the most important part of the economy, slavery, made 
whites naturally superior to blacks. By focusing on the racial inferiority of blacks as the 
justification for a stratified society, the class lines were blurred somewhat. Blacks, as a 
matter of fact, were naturally ill-suited to the type of freedom that whites enjoyed.
116
 
Whites need not worry about their own freedom, as slavery was merely reserved for 
those of an inferior racial stock.  
Such ideas were not always prevalent in the South. In the early 19
th
 century, talk 
of the eventual end of slavery was common in the South, even amongst prominent 
slaveholders. Jefferson, like many other prominent patricians, felt slavery tended to 
direct whites to being unbalanced and tyrannical. Better that blacks should be sent both 
to Africa or the Caribbean, so whites could avoid corruption and white laborers could 
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migrate to the South.
117
 From such ideas sprang the ideas of conditional termination 
and diffusionist theory as ways of bringing about the end of slavery. 
118
  
This would not always be the case, as eventually such calls were replaced by talk 
of slavery as a “positive good”. South Carolina was the first state where such sentiments 
took hold, later extending throughout the South as the 19
th
 century continued. Senator 
John C. Calhoun of South Carolina became the most famous proponent of slavery as a 
positive good in 1837. Addressing the Senate on the issue of banning slavery in the 
District of Columbia, he dismissed the Jeffersonian position of gradual emancipation and 
put forth that the perpetuation of slavery was the best option.  
 
I hold that in the present state of civilization, where two races of different origin, and 
distinguished by color…are brought together, the relation now existing in the 
slaveholding States between the two, is instead of an evil, a good-a positive good.
119
 
 
Such sentiments arose in response to Romantic ideas which spoke of inherently wise, 
human instincts present in all people. Slaveholders argued against such ideas, saying 
that blacks were not a part of this natural human instinct, that blacks were better off 
not having to live on their own.
120
 
 Despite such rhetoric concerning the racial inferiority of blacks as a justification 
for slavery, class tension still existed between slaveholders and non-slaveholders, as 
mentioned previously. The logical argument of men such as Fitzhugh does not go away 
completely just because of a racial basis for slavery. More was needed to solidify the 
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racial identity of southern whites. This extra component came with the fear of a race 
war. The bonding capital created by the racial hierarchy was further enhanced by fears 
of a possible race war stemming out of a slave revolt. Such fears became prevalent after 
the slave uprising in Saint-Domingue at the end of the 18
th
 century. The slaves in that 
French colony rose up and overthrew the slave society, eventually establishing the 
Republic of Haiti. During the course of this revolution, however, many former slaves 
engaged in indiscriminate violence against whites, who had been the predominant 
slaveholding group.
121
  
 Southern slaveholders came to fear that this would come to pass in the U.S. as 
well. These fears only increased as the years passed and the number of slaves in the U.S. 
increased. Fear of a race war proved to reach across class lines, creating a cohesive 
identity for southern whites based on race and not class. Events such as Nat Turner’s 
Rebellion and the Denmark Vesey conspiracy only furthered the fears of whites of a race 
war. As these fears grew, the southern identity only grew stronger as whites bonded 
around their racial identity against a common racial threat. 
 Paramount to preventing this common racial threat was prevention. If slaves 
were simply treated properly (not to be confused with treating them kindly) race war 
could be avoided. This meant, for the most part, ensuring that no one spoke ill of slavery 
regardless of whether they were from the South or were outsiders. As a result, a system 
of violence and intimidation was established which could keep whites in line with 
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slavery using both legal and “extra-legal” means. For instance, the 1830’s saw a 
significant increase in the volume of abolitionist mail delivered to South Carolina, the 
only state at the time to call for the unconditional perpetuation of slavery. The 
postmaster, Alfred Huger of Charleston, refused to deliver the pamphlets, as he 
believed they would foment insurrection amongst the slaves. Whites, hearing of the 
pamphlets and the postmaster’s actions, formed a mob and broke into the office and 
burned the pamphlets. 
This caused a stir in the North, where many felt it was the postmaster’s duty to 
deliver the pamphlets as a federal employee. President Jackson did not share these 
sentiments. He not only wanted the pamphlets locked up in the post office but also 
wanted the names of anyone who came to demand their mail taken and posted 
publically. Amos Kendall, the postmaster general, softened this approach by only 
instructing Huger to lock up mail that the “circumstances of the case justified”. Of 
course, the implied threat of exposure of being soft on slavery ensured that no southern 
white went to demand that mail.
122
 
123
 Whites of all classes could bond in their vigilance 
of who demanded said mail, and could bond in socially isolating those who did so. Thus 
we can see that class lines were blurred with bonding capital generated in defense of 
slavery. 
Events such as this marked a change in the political discourse of the nation, as 
southerners began calling for northern states to “outlaw” anti-slavery appeals and to 
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extradite “fanatics”, namely abolitionists, to the South for trial.
124
 South Carolina, once 
the only state to speak of slavery being perpetuated indefinitely, now had more 
company as most debates on slavery in southern legislatures centered on who was “soft 
on slavery”. Politicians increasingly tried to paint each other as soft on slavery, implying 
they were not loyal to the institution and by implication not loyal to the South. Such 
contests, with each nominee trying to show they were firmer in their support of slavery, 
were exacerbated by the two-party system that emerged in the 1830’s. Both parties, in 
order to ensure victory was not stolen by an organized opposition, had to show they 
were the ones most committed to slavery. Such organized politics left little room for the 
kind of reflective thought inherent in the Jeffersonian approach to slavery and the 
rhetoric concerning slavery became more intractable over time.
125
 
This need to show ones commitment to slavery was not limited to just southern 
politics, but bled into national politics as well. Martin Van Buren, seeking the presidency 
in 1836, had to ensure the South supported him in order to win the election. In pursuit 
of this end, supporters of Van Buren introduced the “gag rule” to Congress. Said rule 
forbid “even the discussion of petitions addressing the subject of slavery either in the 
District [of Columbia] or anywhere else”. Such a measure ensured Van Buren would 
capture the Southern vote.
126
 The fact that a northerner such as Van Buren had to show 
                                                          
124
 Freehling, 292 
125
 Ibid, 295 
126
 Howe, 509 
66 
 
such a commitment to slavery to receive southern votes demonstrates that the terms of 
the discourse had changed; the only way to get southern support was to protect slavery. 
Back in the South, when simple intimidation did not send to ground those who 
were “soft on slavery”, violence ensured the safety of whites. Much of this violence 
consisted of tarring and feathering individuals, which was potentially fatal for the victim, 
and lynching’s, which were always fatal. These attacks were usually reserved for 
foreigners and northerners, whose commitment to slavery was suspect because they 
did not hail from the South nor own slaves. Such violence was more common in the 
years leading up to the Civil War.
127
 Violence, though, was not limited to just outsiders 
but was employed against southern whites as well. Ensuring that southern whites who 
were not firm in their commitment were weeded out was perhaps even more 
important, as their presence could have a more profound impact than some outsider 
merely passing through. Even the hint of being lax in commitment was often enough to 
bring about violence. 
This violence was not unchecked, though, as formal and informal rules existed 
governing how such mobs should operate. First, someone would need to be labeled as a 
dissenter, essentially charging them with holding opinions counter to the safety of 
slavery. For southern slaveholders, any dissenting opinion on slavery was potentially 
                                                          
127
 Freehling, 100 
67 
 
“incendiary”, a testament to the strength of the fear of a race war. After all, no matter 
how well segregated southern society might be slaves can still overhear things.
128
  
When it came to finding evidence against potential dissenters, often the 
testimony of slaves was needed. Now this created a problem for the protectors of 
slavery, as blacks, regardless of whether they were free or slave, were not permitted to 
testify against whites in a court of law. To get around this legal conundrum, whites 
established “quasi-despotic courts” to deal exclusively with the testimony of blacks 
against whites. Said courts were headed by “reputable community leaders” which the 
mob would appoint to be judges in the case.
129
Given how the local economy and social 
advancement rested on support of slavery, it is not unreasonable to expect that these 
judges were plantation owners or at the very least strong supporters of slavery. These 
mobs, in addition to having the power to appoint judges to these kangaroo courts, had 
carte blanche to gather evidence in any manner they saw fit. “Neighborhood patrols 
could legally maraud anywhere, including inside slave cabins, to investigate 
insurrection”.
130
 If a slave needed questioning, torture was often implemented to gain 
testimony. Killing a slave in questioning was not out of bounds either, as preventing a 
slave rebellion was all that mattered. 
With such a system in place, violence ordinarily reserved for blacks could legally 
fall upon whites as well. Between 1830 and 1860 around 300 whites were lynched in the 
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South. The worst recorded mob violence against whites occurred in 1835. There had 
been a scare that a slave insurrection would occur on July 4
th
. Under torture, slaves 
named several whites as the culprits for such a conspiracy whose alleged guilt was 
suspect at best. This touched off a veritable witch-hunt, as more and more blacks were 
tortured to procure more names. By the end, seven whites were lynched based on this 
testimony and many more slaves and free blacks died either from interrogation or 
lynching as well.
131
 Events like these reminded whites of all classes the possible 
repercussions of even appearing soft on slavery, as the seeds of doubt could be planted 
amongst ones neighbors. 
Such episodes, despite the violence and uncertainty, helped create bonding 
capital between poor whites and wealthy slave-owners. “Nothing better solidified a folk 
neighborhood than rich and poor united to tar and feather some alien threat to the 
public safety".
132
 By uniting to combat foreign and domestic threats, southern whites 
found common ground that blurred class lines. Such violence in the service of the public 
interest, though, was limited in in jurisdiction. The idea of paternalism in southern 
society could not allow foreigners, even southerner’s from nearby townships, to pass 
judgment on one of their own. So strong was this sentiment that there are accountants 
of two competing mobs fighting each other; one mob trying to take an alleged dissident 
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from another town and another mob fighting to prevent one of their own from being 
taken.
133
 
One could say that such incidents could only undermine a cohesive identity in 
the South, creating social distance between the slave states. After all, if towns could 
resort to fighting over the execution of maintaining slavery, then cooperation between 
the far-flung slave states seems unlikely. While this seems to be a perfectly reasonable 
argument, it fails to take into account a few points. First, the southern communities 
were united in the belief that foreign meddling was something to be avoided, even if 
that foreign body was merely another township. Second, that despite wanting to 
maintain local control, they still all faced the same threat, potential race war. Thus, they 
were bonded in that should the need arise they could count on each other to help put 
down a rebellion. They just wanted local autonomy when it came to prevention. 
This of course points to how social distance was created and maintained 
between the North and South. The southern slave communities, who were not fond of 
any sort of outsider meddling, perceived the North as hostile to the very fabric of 
southern society. They weren’t committed to slavery; they didn’t even have slaves, 
relying instead on “wage slaves”. Worse yet, abolitionist agitators resided in the North. 
To a southerner, it appeared that the most inflammatory rhetoric against slavery was 
coming from a region where the threat of racial warfare was not omnipresent. These 
outsiders were seen as agitators, as fomenters of racial unrest. It was feared that if 
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slaves commonly heard abolitionist rhetoric they would be whipped into a violent, 
animal frenzy. 
 For this reason, many slave states made anti-slavery comments seditious; such 
talk could spawn a slave rebellion. It is worth noting that such laws were often narrow in 
scope, affecting only those who were members of an abolitionist society.
134
 The moral 
condemnations of abolitionists helped poor whites and slaveholders bond in another 
way. Abolitionists often characterized all southern whites as “ethically inferior”. From an 
abolitionist’s point of view, any white who allowed slavery to continue was morally 
reprehensible. By failing to draw a distinction between those who owned slaves and 
those who merely lived in a slave state, abolitionists essentially helped poor whites and 
slaveholders reinforce the bond between them.
135
  
 In such a scenario, there was no chance for bonding capital to be created 
between North and South; there was merely a chance for animosity to develop. All of 
this serves as an illustration of the unintentionally negative effects of bonding capital. 
While bridging social capital can enlarge out identity, “bonding social capital bolsters 
our narrower selves”.
136
 The bonding capital generated by racial slavery ultimately 
narrowed the scope of any identity that southerners could form. They could not identify 
with any group who did not have the same alien threat to the public safety.”
137
 The 
threat of race war helped white of all socioeconomic backgrounds bond together, 
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helping to create a cohesive identity, as they came together to combat a threat that 
touched all white men. Furthermore, this violence and intimidation reached across class 
lines, as both rich and poor were targeted by such mobs.
138
 The chance for a truly 
national identity amongst both the North and South was impossible as long as such 
bonding capital created by slavery was present in the South.  
The impact of this bonding capital can be illustrated by looking at how each of 
the three southern regions, Border, Middle, and Deep, would have experienced this 
bonding capital. Fears of race war would have varied again depending on a states 
number of slaves. The Border States would have had the least to fear, as fewer blacks 
lived there. In Maryland and Delaware, it was debated publically whether removing 
freed blacks from the state, an important action in the minds of many whites 
throughout the South, was even necessary Civil War.
139
 This debate, in a region with the 
highest percentage of free blacks, illustrates how fear of a racial conflict was less severe 
in this region. As a result, there would have been a stronger possibility for bridging 
social capital to be created with the North, and social distance would have been less. As 
discussed in a previous section, the Border States had much more in common 
economically in many ways with the North than they did with the South. This would 
have served as bridging capital, allowing them to create broader identities that included 
the North. 
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The Middle South experienced middling levels of this same social experience, so 
the violence and intimidation would have been greater than in the Border States. They 
did, however, have a healthy fear of race war despite a smaller number of slaves 
compared to the Deep South. States such as Virginia, after all, used the argument that 
selling slaves to the Deep South would help them avoid the calamity of having too many 
blacks in the state. Potential conflict lay at the heart of the domestic slave trade, so they 
would have had common cause with the Deep South in trying to avoid a racial war. Add 
to this the economic incentives of said domestic slave trade and increased solidarity 
with the Deep South thanks to the Transportation Revolution and re-coordination 
seems a fitting choice for the Middle South. 
The Deep South is, of course, where the commitment to maintaining slavery and 
the social hierarchy would have been strongest. The number of blacks in proportion to 
the whites helped create a rather paranoid people in the Deep South; fearful of 
anything that might set off the tinder that they had created throughout the southern 
plantations. It is in the Deep South that the sentiments of secession bubbled up long 
before the states such as Virginia and Tennessee were willing to consider them, with 
events such as the Nullification Crisis originating in the Deep South, namely South 
Carolina. For them, the jump to secession was easiest as they had the most to lose by 
abolition and had the most to fear from race war. The Deep South may have seceded 
sooner, had the cost of re-coordinating not included leaving the Middle South and 
Border South as well. 
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Slavery played a curious role in the South. Due to its basis on race, slavery 
allowed whites of all socioeconomic backgrounds to bond around a common identity 
and threat. This bonding capital allowed for class tensions, which could have been 
potentially crippling for any sort of collective effort, to be pushed to the background. 
The cost of this, though, was a narrower identity, one centered on the maintenance of 
slavery and being white. This narrow identity created barriers between the South and 
North, barriers that could not be bridged by anything other than the North declaring its 
unfaltering allegiance to slavery. Thus, the cost of re-coordinating was greatly reduced 
due to the impact of slavery on the social capital of the South. 
 
Closing Comments 
 
The Civil War was a conflict that divided a people of similar language, religion 
and ancestry. Slavery was what caused this war. It was slavery that started the South 
down a path that only a war could dislodge it from. Slavery became the all-important 
linchpin of the southern economy, as it allowed forever increasing profits from cotton 
and other goods. Further north, where cotton wasn’t viable, the domestic slave trade 
became a central part of the economy. With the international slave trade closed, these 
states had a monopoly when it came to the sale of slaves. As the nation expanded and 
those moving west wanted to bring slaves into the territories, conflict arose with Free 
Soiler settlers.  
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The Transportation Revolution also saw an opportunity for the South to become 
more integrated with the North gone unheeded. Instead of investing in new innovations 
such as the railroad, the South poured more capital into slavery.  Attempting to 
integrate into the emerging national economy was not of interest to most southerners. 
What the transportation revolution did do, though, was enable far-flung peoples to 
maintain a level of cohesion not possible before the 19
th
 century. The problem with this, 
though, is that this increased connection merely polarized the two regions, making the 
competition for new territory seem as though all had a stake in it. In previous times, 
before the advent of the railroad, neither free states nor slave states may have been 
able to maintain the type of strong cohesion necessary for re-coordination.  
Most importantly, the siege mentality of southerners made re-coordination all 
the more likely. With the constant fear of race war looming over them and an obsession 
with stemming the tide of foreign agitators the likelihood of re-coordination became all 
the more likely. Staying within a coordination system where half the states were 
opposed to slavery would be a dangerous proposition, not just economically but 
physically as well. If slaves continued to hear the rhetoric of abolitionists, who also 
claimed the mantle of Americans, then a race war may have been inevitable. This fear 
allowed southerners of all socioeconomic backgrounds to come together, to prefer the 
uncertainty of re-coordination than the threat of race war. 
In closing, the economic incentives of a slave economy could certainly be seen as 
adequate for leading the South to secede.  After all, cotton was bringing in considerable 
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profits thanks in large part to slavery. But the social effects of slavery ensured that the 
costs of re-coordination were especially low by the time the South left the Union. 
Slavery helped create both literal and figurative barriers between the North and the 
South. Literally slavery diverted capital that could have been used for transportation 
improvements, improvements that could have helped the South become more 
integrated into the national economy. Figuratively, slavery created an identity for 
southerners that looked on all outsiders as potentially dangerous. Even slave-owners 
from other towns were not to be trusted entirely. Such an identity created a type of 
arms race where politicians had to outdo each other in their commitment to the 
peculiar institution. This shared identity and the mentality that arose out of it, was the 
foundation of the South’s decision to secede, to re-coordinate. Without such an 
identity, the collective effort of such an undertaking would have been impossible. 
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